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Stop-and-frisk has emerged as a popular crime control tactic in 
American policing.  Though stop-and-frisk has a long, established legal 
history, the recent experiences in many jurisdictions demonstrate a 
strong disconnect between principle and practice.  Arguably, stop-and-
frisk has become the next iteration of a persistent undercurrent in racial 
injustice in American policing, perhaps best demonstrated by the recent 
police killings of Eric Garner, Michael Brown, and Freddie Gray—all 
during stop-and-frisk encounters.  Recent events have facilitated a 
national dialogue on police accountability and police reform, and 
federal civil litigation has been central to that discussion.  Although 
federal court relief can be pursued through a variety of avenues (most 
frequently by individuals or class actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or by 
the U.S. Department of Justice pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141), very little 
research has examined the impact of federal civil litigation on 
unconstitutional police practices.  The current study examines the New 
York City confluence of racial injustice in policing, misuse of stop-and-
frisk by officers, and federal civil litigation designed to precipitate police 
reform.  Authors employ a natural experimental design to conduct a 
year-to-year comparison of stop-and-frisk activities and outcomes 
conducted by the NYPD in 2011, during the height of their stop-and-frisk 
program, and 2014, one year after a federal court deemed the program 
unconstitutional and ordered reforms.  Results show substantial 
improvement in stop-and-frisk practices following the federal civil 
litigation, including reduced prevalence and geographic concentration, 
as well as increased rates of arrest and weapon and contraband seizures.  
Moreover, crime continued to decline in New York as the NYPD 
reformed its stop-and-frisk program.  Even though racial disparities in 
those subjected to stops by the NYPD persist, the overall findings show 
positive progress in New York and highlight the role of federal civil 
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Police authority to stop, question, and frisk citizens on the street has been a 
controversial police practice for more than a century.  Consider that in 1942, Sam 
B. Warner, a member of the Interstate Commission on Crime, started his law 
review article on the Uniform Arrest Act by noting that the law governing police 
authority to stop, question, frisk, and arrest suspects “illustrates the discrepancy 
between law in the books and the law in action.”1  Since the early 1990s, this 
discrepancy has grown into a highly divisive controversy as a function of a strong 
disconnect between how police authority to stop, question, and frisk suspects is 
supposed to work in principle, and how it has actually worked in practice.2  
On one hand, the practice is grounded in a historical and legal tradition dating 
back hundreds of years.  The basis of a police officer’s authority to stop, question, 
and frisk a suspicious person can be traced back to English common law, as 
watchmen and private citizens had the authority to “arrest any suspicious night-
walker, and detain him till he give a good account of himself.”3  That common law 
approach to stop-and-frisk carried over to some United States jurisdictions, 
although the legal authority for the practice was nebulous at best.4  The lack of a 
clear legal framework for stop-and-frisk led the U.S. Interstate Commission on 
Crime to draft the Uniform Arrest Act in 1939.5  That model statute outlined nine 
different types of police-citizen contacts including “[q]uestioning and detaining 
suspects” and “[s]earching suspects for weapons.”6 
Litigation over various statutes authorizing stop-and-frisk led the U.S. 
Supreme Court to formally establish stop-and-frisk as a constitutionally 
permissible policing tactic in the landmark 1968 decision in Terry v. Ohio.7  In the 
Terry case, the Court held that police may temporarily detain and question a citizen 
if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person may be involved in 
criminal activity. 8   The Court also held that officers may superficially search 
(frisk) a detained person if there is reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person 
may be armed and dangerous.9  Since the Terry ruling, the Court has not only 
                                                                                                                            
 
1   Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 315 (1942). 
2   MICHAEL D. WHITE & HENRY F. FRADELLA, STOP AND FRISK: THE USE AND ABUSE OF A 
CONTROVERSIAL POLICING TACTIC (2016).  
3   2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 129 (London, 8th ed. 1824) 
(1716). 
4   Warner, supra note 1, at 319–20.  
5   Id. at 316.  
6   Id. at 317. 
7   Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
8   Id. at 21–23.  See generally JOHN N. FERDICO, HENRY F. FRADELLA & CHRISTOPHER D. 
TOTTEN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONAL 306–37 (12th ed. 2015).  
9   Terry, 392 U.S. at 23–24; see also FERDICO, FRADELLA & TOTTEN, supra note 8, at 337–40. 




consistently reaffirmed the constitutionality of stop-and-frisk, but also expanded 
officers’ authority during such stops.10   
On the other hand, police use of stop-and-frisk in numerous jurisdictions has 
strayed dramatically from the principles set forth in Terry and its progeny.11  In 
some cases, police use of stop-and-frisk has been characterized by gross overuse 
and misuse of the strategy, violations of citizens’ Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights, strained police-community relationships, low or no police 
legitimacy, and significant emotional, psychological, and physical consequences 
experienced by citizens.12   The New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) 
epitomizes this story.  In 1999, the Office of the New York State Attorney General 
released a report that examined 175,000 stops and raised serious questions about 
their constitutionality, as well as racial disparities in those who were stopped.13  
Allegations of racial discrimination in stops conducted by the NYPD led to two 
federal lawsuits that mired the NYPD and its stop-and-frisk program in federal 
court for more than a decade: Daniels v. City of New York14 and Floyd v. City of 
New York.15  The controversy came to a head in August 2013, when U.S. District 
Court Judge Shira Scheindlin ruled that the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program was 
unconstitutional.16 
Allegations of racial discrimination in Terry stops have not been limited to 
New York.  In November 2010, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of 
Pennsylvania filed a lawsuit in federal court alleging that the Philadelphia Police 
                                                                                                                            
 
10  See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 
(1980); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
11  See generally WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 2, passim. 
12  Id.  See also Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship between the Constitutionality and 
Effectiveness of New York City “Stop-and-Frisk,” 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495 (2014); Bennett Capers, 
Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1 (2011); David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1994); Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. 
L.J. 423 (2004); Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police 
Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271 (1998); Thomas B. McAffee, Setting Us Up for Disaster: The 
Supreme Court’s Decision in Terry v. Ohio, 12 NEV. L.J. 609 (2012).  
13  ELIOT SPITZER, THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP-AND-FRISK” PRACTICES: 
A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
(1999), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/sites/default/files/pdfs/bureaus/civil_rights/stp_frsk.pdf.  
14  Complaint, Daniels v. City of New York, 1:99-cv-01695-SAS (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 1999); see 
also Daniels v. City of New York, 138 F. Supp. 2d 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
15  Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Floyd v. City of New York, 08-cv-01034-SAS 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2008), http://ccrjustice.org/files/Floyd_Complaint_08.01.31.pdf; see also Floyd v. 
City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); id. at 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), stay granted 
sub nom Ligon v. City of New York, 538 Fed. Appx. 101 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated in part by 743 F.3d 
362 (2d Cir. 2014). 
16  Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 540. 
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Department was engaged in widespread racial profiling.17  A report of the ACLU 
of New Jersey examined stop-and-frisk activities of the Newark Police Department 
during the last half of 2013 and concluded: “Newark police officers use stop-and-
frisk with troubling frequency. . . . Black Newarkers bear the disproportionate 
brunt of stop-and-frisks. . . . [and] [t]he majority of people stopped [75%] are 
innocent.”18  Similar stories have unfolded in Detroit, Michigan; Chicago, Illinois; 
Miami Gardens, Florida; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 
just to name a few of the more prominent examples.  
The cases of Eric Garner in New York City, Michael Brown in Ferguson, 
Missouri, and Freddie Gray in Baltimore, Maryland demonstrate the severe and 
long-lasting consequences of mass stop-and-frisk programs: Garner, Brown, and 
Gray died during encounters with the police that began as Terry stops.  Their 
deaths, among others, grabbed national headlines, produced widespread public 
protest and civil disorder, led to a White House-driven initiative for police reform, 
and fostered larger discussions about the mechanisms for responding to and 
eliminating widespread racially discriminatory police practices—including federal 
civil litigation.19 
Despite the controversy surrounding its stop-and-frisk program—and the 
federal civil litigation it generated (the Daniels and Floyd cases)—NYPD officers 
conducted more than 685,000 stops in 2011, most of which affected New Yorkers 
from racial and ethnic minority backgrounds.20  In the year following the Floyd 
ruling in August 2013 (when the program was deemed unconstitutional by the 
federal court), newly-elected mayor William de Blasio dropped the City’s appeal 
of the ruling, appointed William Bratton as the new Police Commissioner, and 
began working with Commissioner Bratton to implement the remedies ordered in 
Judge Scheindlin’s ruling.21  The recent developments in the NYPD stop-and-frisk 
case allow the authors to employ a natural experimental design to assess the impact 
                                                                                                                            
 
17  Complaint, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 210CV05952, 2010 WL 4662865 (E.D. Pa. 
Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/669/198/; see also Settlement 
Agreement, Class Certification & Consent Decree, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. 
Pa. June 21, 2011), http://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/744/198/. 
18  UDI OFER & ARI ROSMARIN, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.J., STOP-AND-FRISK: A FIRST 
LOOK 5 (2014), https://www.aclu-nj.org/files/8113/9333/6064/2014_02_25_nwksnf.pdf. 
19  See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING (2015), 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/TaskForce_FinalReport.pdf.   
20  Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-
frisk-data (last visited Aug. 23, 2016); see also N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, STOP, QUESTION AND FRISK 
REPORT DATABASE [hereinafter NYPD STOP-AND-FRISK DATABASE], 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/analysis_and_planning/stop_question_and_frisk_report.shtml 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2016). 
21  Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle Suits on Stop-
and-Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/nyregion/de-
blasio-stop-and-frisk.html.  




of the federal civil litigation on stop-and-frisks in New York during two years: in 
2011, when the program was at its height, and in 2014, one year after the Floyd 
ruling.  To do so, we employ descriptive statistical analyses of NYPD stop-and-
frisk data to explore changes in prevalence, geographic concentration, outcomes 
(e.g., searches, arrests, weapons, and contraband seized), and racial disparities 
among persons stopped.  We also examine crime trends in New York through 2014 
to assess whether changes in stop-and-frisk may have affected the NYPD’s ability 
to fight crime.  These analyses allow us to draw inferences about the impact of the 
Floyd ruling on stop-and-frisk practices in New York City.  And given the dearth 
of empirical research in this area, the current study also offers broader insights on 
the potential for federal civil litigation to serve as an effective instrument of police 
reform. 
Part II examines the origins of stop-and-frisk, as well as the relevant court 
rulings that have shaped officers’ authority to engage in temporary detention, 
questioning, and frisking of citizens.  Part III discusses the persistent undercurrent 
of racial injustice in American policing, and highlights the important context this 
undercurrent provides for considering the impact of police use of Terry stops as a 
mass crime-control strategy.  Part IV tells the New York story, where the 
undercurrent of racial injustice, stop-and-frisk, and federal civil litigation have 
collided for a period of more than two decades.  Part V provides an overview of 
the two primary mechanisms by which civil litigation in federal court can be 
employed as an instrument of police reform under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14141.  Part VI describes the methods employed by the authors in the current 
study and Part VII details the results of the year-to-year comparison of stop-and-
frisk activities and outcomes.  Part VIII discusses the implications of the results for 
police reform in New York and highlights the broader role of federal court 
litigation as an instrument of police reform in 21st century policing. 
 
II. THE ORIGINS AND AUTHORITY OF STOP-AND-FRISK22 
 
A law enforcement officer’s legal authority to detain and question a 
suspicious person dates back to the common law of England.  English common 
law had very strict rules governing formal arrests. 23   Legal proscriptions on 






                                                                                                                            
 
22  Portions of Part II are adapted from WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 2, at ch. 3. 
23  John A. Ronayne, The Right to Investigate and New York’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Law, 33 
FORDHAM L. REV. 211 (1964). 
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A. From English Common Law to the Uniform Arrest Act 
 
English constables and “watchmen” were permitted to detain “night-
walkers”—suspicious people encountered at night. 24   Indeed, according to Sir 
Matthew Hale’s treatise on English common law, those on the night watch could 
legally “arrest such as pass by until the morning, and if no suspicion, they are then 
to be delivered [released], and if suspicion be touching them, they shall be 
delivered to the sheriff.”25  Even private citizens had the authority to detain and 
question suspicious “night-walkers.”26 
Until 1939, there was considerable variation in how U.S. law handled police-
initiated contacts with citizens that did not reach the level of arrest.  In some states, 
it was unclear if American common law, borrowing from its English antecedents, 
conferred a right to detain and question suspects when the requirements for a full 
arrest were clearly absent.27  In other jurisdictions, the right to detain and question 
suspects was conferred on police by state statute or by municipal ordinance.28  In 
these states, detentions for questioning “were generally left to the discretion of 
individual officers and were not subject to constitutional protections or judicial 
oversight.”29  Inconsistency in state law came to be viewed as “entirely inadequate 
to meet the modern needs for questioning and detaining suspects.”30   
In 1939, the Interstate Commission on Crime authorized a study to examine 
how arrests were made across the United States.  The study examined the 
feasibility of creating a model law that states could adopt to harmonize arrest 
practices across the country and to bring the actions of police into alignment with 
constitutional standards.31  Once drafted, that model law became known as the 
Uniform Arrest Act.  Its provisions dealt with nine types of police-initiated 
contacts with citizens, the first two of which were “[q]uestioning and detaining 
suspects” and “[s]earching suspects for weapons.”32  Section 2 of the Uniform 
Arrest Act provided: “A peace officer may stop any person abroad whom he has 
reasonable ground to suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a 
crime . . . . The total period of detention provided for by this section shall not 
exceed two hours.”33  Additionally, Section 3 of the Act stated that an officer was 
                                                                                                                            
 
24  Id. at 214. 
25  2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 96 (Philadelphia, Robert H. 
Small 1847); see also Lawrence v. Hedger, 3 Taunt. 14, 128 Eng. Rep. 6 (C.P. 1810). 
26  HAWKINS, supra note 3, at 129. 
27  Warner, supra note 1, at 319–20.  
28  Id. at 319 (citing 1932 MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 41, § 98; 1926 N.H. Pub. Laws c. 363, § 12). 
29  FERDICO, FRADELLA & TOTTEN, supra note 8, at 308. 
30  Warner, supra note 1, at 317. 
31  Id. at 316–17. 
32  Id. at 317. 
33  Id. at 320–21.  




permitted to conduct a “search for a dangerous weapon . . . whenever he has 
reasonable ground to believe [a person stopped or detained for questioning] . . . 
possesses a dangerous weapon.”34 
In 1941, the legislatures of New Hampshire and Rhode Island adopted the 
Uniform Arrest Act as the laws of their states.35  Delaware followed suit in 1951.36  
Other states enacted statutes authorizing stop-and-frisk practices that were not 
consistent with the Uniform Arrest Act. 37   As a consequence, considerable 
variation persisted across states with regard to stop-and-frisk authority. 38  
Prompted by the need to clarify the scope of permissible conduct during stop-and-
frisk procedures (and, perhaps, concerns about how vagrancy and loitering laws 
contributed to police infringements on constitutionally protected liberty interests), 
the U.S. Supreme Court issues three landmark rulings in 1968 that set federal 
constitutional benchmarks for stop-and-frisk within the framework of the Fourth 
Amendment: Terry v. Ohio39 and the companion cases of Sibron v. New York and 
Peters v. New York.40  In the interest of brevity, the next section summarizes only 
the key facts and holdings of these cases.41 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
34  Id. at 325. 
35  1941 N.H. Laws 242, ch. 163 (codified as amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 594:1–
594:23 (1955)); 1941 R.I. Pub. Laws 21, ch. 982 (codified as amended at R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 
12-7-1 to 12-7-17 (1956)). 
36  48 Del. Laws 769, ch. 304 (1951) (codified as amended in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 
1901–1912 (1953)). 
37  Ronayne, supra note 23, at 215. 
38  It should be noted that laws against vagrancy and loitering exacerbated the problems 
attendant to unclear stop-and-frisk authority.  Indeed, vagrancy and loitering laws blurred suspicion 
with criminal conduct by permitting the police to make arrests—and searches incident to arrest—
whenever someone seemed out-of-place or presented as an “undesirable” in a particular location.  See 
Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 604 (1956).  
It is important to note that two quite different kinds of suspicion are involved.  The 
alleged vagrant may be suspected of past criminality, the arrest for vagrancy offering the 
opportunity to investigate whether the suspect is wanted in another jurisdiction or has 
committed other crimes.  On the other hand, the suspicion may be of future criminality, 
the inference being that purposeful poverty is likely to lead to other crimes unless the 
state steps in. 
Id. at 625 (footnote omitted).  In other words, much of the crime-prevention work accomplished by 
modern stop-and-frisk procedures used to be accomplished by vagrancy and loitering law arrests.  
Perhaps it is therefore unsurprising that within four years of the Terry, Sibron, and Peters stop-and-
frisk triumvirate, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a vagrancy ordinance on vagueness grounds.  
See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
39  392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
40  392 U.S. 40 (1968). 
41  For a more detailed and in-depth analysis of the facts, holdings, rationale, and impact of 
these important cases, see WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 2, at ch. 3. 
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B. Terry, Sibron, and Peters  
 
In Terry, Detective Martin McFadden testified that he observed two men 
while on patrol.  The Court summarized McFadden’s observations as follows: 
 
He saw one of the men leave the other one and walk southwest on Huron 
Road, past some stores.  The man paused for a moment and looked in a 
store window, then walked on a short distance, turned around and walked 
back toward the corner, pausing once again to look in the same store 
window.  He rejoined his companion at the corner, and the two conferred 
briefly.  Then the second man went through the same series of motions, 
strolling down Huron Road, looking in the same window, walking on a 
short distance, turning back, peering in the store window again, and 
returning to confer with the first man at the corner.  The two men 
repeated this ritual alternately between five and six times apiece—in all, 
roughly a dozen trips.  At one point, while the two were standing 
together on the corner, a third man approached them and engaged them 
briefly in conversation.  This man then left the two others and walked 
west on Euclid Avenue.  Chilton and Terry resumed their measured 
pacing, peering, and conferring.  After this had gone on for 10 to 12 
minutes, the two men walked off together, heading west on Euclid 
Avenue, following the path taken earlier by the third man.42 
 
McFadden’s observations led him to suspect that the men were planning to commit 
a robbery in the store.  He therefore approached the men and began to question 
them.  Fearing that they might be armed, he patted them down and recovered a 
revolver on two of the men.  McFadden arrested the men for illegal possession of 
the firearms.  
In upholding their convictions, the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that the 
Fourth Amendment applies to stop-and-frisk activities. 43   But “[i]nstead of 
applying the probable cause standard to stops-and-frisks, the Court applied the 
fundamental test of the Fourth Amendment: the reasonableness under all the 
circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal 
security.”44   In deciding to analyze the reasonableness of Officer McFadden’s 
                                                                                                                            
 
42  Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.  
43  Id. at 8, 10, 16–27.  Notably, the majority decision in Terry did not clearly distinguish the 
stop from the frisk.  See id. at 10–12. Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion did so and clarified that a 
stop is distinct from an arrest and a frisk is different from a search, even though the Fourth 
Amendment applies to both police activities.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 31–34 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
Subsequent cases adopted his formulation.  See John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: 
A Look Inside the Supreme Court’s Conference, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 749, 813 (1998). 
44  FERDICO, FRADELLA & TOTTEN, supra note 8, at 309. 




conduct, the Court approved a line of inquiry that is distinct from questions of 
probable cause.  Indeed, the Court analyzed the “reasonableness of Officer 
McFadden’s conduct as a general proposition” by balancing “the need to search [or 
seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.”45  Moreover, the 
Court maintained that this balancing test depends on whether a law enforcement 
officer can “point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”46  The 
Court then applied a similar balancing test to assess the reasonableness of 
McFadden’s search for weapons.  In doing so, the Court found the search to be 
permissible under the Fourth Amendment in large part because of its limited 
nature—namely the “pat down” of the men’s outer clothing for weapons: “He did 
not conduct a general exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity 
he might find.”47  
In Sibron, the defendant was convicted of the unlawful possession of heroin.  
Over the course of several hours, a police officer observed the defendant talking 
with “six or eight persons whom he (Patrolman Martin) knew from past experience 
to be narcotics addicts.”48  The officer did not hear any of the conversations, nor 
did anyone ever pass anything to the defendant during these conversations.  
Nonetheless, the officer subsequently approached Sibron and said, “You know 
what I am after,” prompting Sibron to reach into his pocket.  That action, in turn, 
caused the officer to reach into Sibron’s pocket and retrieve “several glassine 
envelopes” that contained heroin.49  The U.S. Supreme Court overturned Sibron’s 
conviction on the grounds that the officer’s initial stop was not supported by 
reasonable suspicion that Sibron was involved in any criminal activity.  So far as 
the officer knew, “they might indeed ‘have been talking about the World Series.’  
The inference that persons who talk to narcotics addicts are engaged in the 
criminal traffic in narcotics is simply not the sort of reasonable inference required 
to support an intrusion by the police upon an individual’s personal security.”50  
Moreover, the Court determined that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that 
Sibron was armed and dangerous.  In fact, the Court reasoned that the officer’s 
“opening statement to Sibron—‘You know what I am after’—made it abundantly 
clear that he sought narcotics” and did not believe that Sibron was reaching for a 
weapon.51 
                                                                                                                            
 
45  Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–21. 
46  Id. at 21. 
47  Id. at 30. 
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51  Id. at 64. 
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In Peters, an off-duty police officer heard strange noises outside his apartment 
door.  He investigated and observed two men he had never seen before “tiptoeing” 
out of the apartment building in which the officer had lived for 12 years.  
“Believing that he had happened upon the two men in the course of an attempted 
burglary,” the officer “opened his door, entered the hallway and slammed the door 
loudly behind him.  This precipitated a flight down the stairs on the part of the two 
men, and [the officer] gave chase.”52  The officer patted down the men and found 
burglar’s tools.  The Court affirmed Peters’ conviction because the officer had 
probable cause to believe the men were involved in an attempted burglary.  In light 
of the existence of probable cause to arrest, the search of Peters could be justified 
as a search incident to arrest—a more complete search than the limited frisk/pat-
down for weapons authorized under Terry.53 
 
C. Key Court Cases After 1968 
 
Terry v. Ohio established the legal parameters for stop-and-frisk in the United 
States.  The Supreme Court revisited stop-and-frisk just over a decade later.  In two 
cases, Brown v. Texas 54  and Ybarra v. Illinois, 55  the Court invalidated police 
actions and reinforced the narrow authority granted under Terry.  By the 1980s, 
however, courts began to interpret Terry as providing significant leeway to law 
enforcement officers to conduct stops.  Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court 
directed the lower courts to assess the validity of stops based on “the whole 
picture”—or what came to be known as the “totality of the circumstances.” 56  
Perhaps more importantly, the Court told lower courts to defer to the professional 
judgment and experience of police when assessing the totality of the 
circumstances.57 
Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court exempted several classes of 
stops from the usual requirements of Terry.  For example, in United States v. 
Mendenhall, the Court ruled that a stop had not occurred when federal agents 
approached the defendant in the open concourse area of an airport.58  Because the 
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56  United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). 
57  Id. at 421–22 (emphasizing that the relevant line of inquiry in the case was “whether, based 
upon the whole picture, they, as experienced Border Patrol officers, could reasonably surmise that the 
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Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 666 
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58  United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). 




agents neither wore uniforms nor displayed weapons, and because they 
requested—but did not demand—to see the defendant’s ticket and identification, 
the Court reasoned that the encounter did not constitute a stop that qualified as a 
seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, but rather a voluntary and cooperative 
encounter because at no time should a reasonable person in the defendant’s 
situation have ever felt that she could not leave.59  Then, in I.N.S. v. Delgado, the 
“free to leave” test morphed into something even more restrictive on personal 
liberty: free to continue working and moving about a factory while armed agents 
wearing badges roamed the premises questioning people about their immigration 
status.60  The Court further narrowed Terry in Florida v. Bostick when it clarified 
that law enforcement officers have the authority to stop and ask basic investigatory 
questions—including requests to examine identification or to search luggage of bus 
passengers—without there being a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes “as 
long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is 
required.”61  In short, Bostick all but abandoned Mendenhall’s free-to-leave test by 
changing the inquiry to one of coercive police tactics through shows of authority. 
In other cases, the U.S. Supreme Court extended the authority of police to 
conduct frisks.  Consider that in Michigan v. Long, the Court permitted the police 
to conduct a brief search of the passenger compartment of a car to look for hidden 
weapons.62   
Perhaps most importantly, the Court has partially retreated from Sibron’s 
holding that reasonable suspicion needed to be based on more than just hunches.  
In Alabama v. White, the Court upheld a stop of a vehicle based on an anonymous 
tip even though there was no indication of the reliability of the tip.63  Michigan 
Department of State Police v. Sitz authorized sobriety checkpoints at which police 
stopped drivers without any particularized suspicion of driving-while-impaired.64  
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton upheld random (i.e., suspicionless) drug 
testing of student athletes,65 and Board of Education of Independent School Dist. 
                                                                                                                            
 
59  Id. at 554–55. 
60  I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984). 
61  Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991). 
62  Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1035 (1983). 
63  Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990). 
64  Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990).  City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), curtailed law enforcement authority to use drug-sniffing dogs at 
roadblocks on the grounds that the DUI checkpoints sanctioned in Sitz were “designed to serve 
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” id. at 37 (internal quotations omitted), 
whereas suspicionless searches using drug-sniffing dogs at roadblocks impermissibly extended into 
the realm of investigating “ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”  Id. at 38.  Nonetheless, Sitz remains good 
law insofar as it permits stops of vehicles at DUI checkpoints without any particularized suspicion of 
impaired driving. 
65  Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664–65 (1995).  The majority in 
Vernonia employed a “special needs” rationale similar to the road safety one utilized in Sitz.  
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No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls extended that reasoning to uphold random 
drug testing of all students who participate in any extracurricular activities. 66  
Illinois v. Wardlow approved an inference of suspicion from flight67—an inference 
that logically extends to any type of evasive behavior.68  Whren v. United States 
upheld pretextual stops, thereby allowing police to conduct stops for minor 
infractions so they could investigate other, more serious crimes.69  And because 
Minnesota v. Dickerson approved of the so-called “plain feel” exception,70 police 
likely have an incentive to frisk people even when they do not actually fear the 
presence of a weapon, but rather hope to feel some drugs in the pat down—a 
seemingly permissible pretext in light of Whren.71 
In sum, the Terry ruling in 1968 set the initial rules for stop-and-frisk.  Since 
1980, Court rulings in most of the associated cases have expanded police authority 
to stop, question, and frisk citizens.  This expanded authority undoubtedly 
increased the risk that officers would employ racial, ethnic, and socio-economic 
class stereotypes as part of a calculus of suspicion to initiate stop-and-frisk 
activities.  The expansion of stop-and-frisk authority, and the increased risk of 
racial profiling, is especially problematic when considering the persistent 
undercurrent of racial injustice throughout nearly two centuries of American 
policing. 
 
III. STOP-AND-FRISK AND THE UNDERCURRENT OF RACIAL INJUSTICE72 
 
An undercurrent of racial injustice and discrimination has served as a 
backdrop in professional policing in the United States for the last 175 years.73  The 
larger race relation problems that have defined American policing provide an 
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67  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). 
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Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area” Question: Requiring 
Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1587, 1590 n.12 (2008).  
69  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811–12 (1996). 
70  Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 371 (1993). 
71  Janet Koven Levit called such pretexts “the Death of Terry v. Ohio.”  Janet Koven Levit, 
Pretextual Traffic Stops: United States v. Whren and the Death of Terry v. Ohio, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
145, 145 (1996); see also Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional: 
Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882 
(2015). 
72  Portions of Part III are adapted from WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 2, at ch. 6. 
73  WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 2, passim. 




important lens through which to view the rulings in Terry and subsequent cases, as 
well as the increasing reliance on mass stop-and-frisk programs in New York and 
elsewhere.  
 
A. Racial Issues in Terry v. Ohio 
 
In his opinion in Terry v. Ohio, Chief Justice Warren noted that stop-and-frisk 
activities by police contributed to racial strife: 
 
We would be less than candid if we did not acknowledge that this 
question thrusts to the fore difficult and troublesome issues regarding a 
sensitive area of police activity—issues which have never before been 
squarely presented to this Court.  Reflective of the tensions involved are 
the practical and constitutional arguments pressed with great vigor on 
both sides of the public debate over the power of the police to “stop and 
frisk”—as it is sometimes euphemistically termed—suspicious persons.74   
 
The opinions in Terry, however, omitted or glossed over several important 
facts relevant to the racial issues underlying the case.  Indeed, nowhere in any of 
the opinions in Terry does any justice mention that both Terry and Chilton were 
black men.75  Nor does any justice mention that Katz, who was white, was not 
charged; he was held as a “suspicious person” and released after two days.76  
According to the transcript of the trial court’s suppression hearing in Terry, Officer 
McFadden testified that when he saw the men standing on the street, “they didn’t 
look right to [him] at the time.”77  Criminologists Delores Jones-Brown and Brian 
Maule suggested that McFadden’s attention may have been drawn to the men on 
account of their race.78  This conclusion is bolstered by a number of ambiguities 
and inconsistencies in Officer McFadden’s account of the case, as law professor 
Lewis R. Katz explained: 
 
[McFadden] was not acquainted with either man by name or sight, and 
he had received “[a]bsolutely no information regarding [the] men at all.”  
Officer McFadden did not explain what about the two men “didn’t look 
right” to him.  The two men were dressed in topcoats, the standard dress 
                                                                                                                            
 
74  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1968). 
75  John Q. Barrett, Appendix B: State of Ohio v. Richard D. Chilton and State of Ohio v. John 
W. Terry: The Suppression Hearing and Trial Transcripts, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1387 (1998). 
76  Id. at 1465. 
77  Id. at 1456. 
78  Delores Jones-Brown & Brian A. Maule, Racially Biased Policing: A Review of the 
Judicial and Legislative Literature, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL 
READINGS 140, 145 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds., 2010). 
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of the day.  They were engaged in no unusual behavior when they 
initially attracted McFadden’s attention.  When pressed on what about 
the two men attracted his interest and whether he would pursue them as 
he did if he saw them that day across from the courthouse, Officer 
McFadden replied, “I really don’t know.”  
What happened as McFadden studied Terry and Chilton depends 
upon which version of Officer McFadden’s statement of the facts one 
reads and in which court opinion the facts appear.  McFadden watched 
the men over a period ten minutes.  He watched as one of the two men 
left the other and walked down the street and looked inside a shop 
window and continued walking, and then walked back to the other man, 
again looking in the shop window.  The second man then repeated the 
same behavior.  That behavior is the critical conduct which gives rise to 
the stop in this case.  If they did it once or twice each, their behavior was 
pretty unremarkable.  So, how many times they looked in the store 
window is crucial.  In the police report filed the same day as the incident, 
Officer McFadden wrote that the men did this “about three times each.”  
Between the day of the event when he wrote the police report and his 
memory was freshest, and the suppression hearing, which was almost 
one year to the day after the event, Officer McFadden’s memory 
changed.  At the suppression hearing three times each became “at least 
four or five times apiece,” which later turned into four to six trips each.  
Moreover, at trial, when asked how many trips he observed, Officer 
McFadden replied, “about four trips, three to four trips, maybe four to 
five trips, maybe a little more, it might be a little less.  I don’t know, I 
didn’t count the trips.”  The Ohio Court of Appeals decision in the case 
picked up on the uncertainty and asserted that the men separated and 
looked in the window “at least two to five times” each.  However, by the 
time the fact worked its way into Chief Justice Warren’s majority 
opinion in the Supreme Court, the number expands exponentially.  He 
wrote that the men did this “between five or six times apiece—in all 
roughly a dozen trips.”  Later in the majority opinion, Chief Justice 
Warren came up with still another number when he described Terry and 
Chilton’s behavior: “where these men pace alternately along an identical 
route, pausing to stare in the same store window roughly twenty-four 
times.”  The body of law which stems from Terry is dependent upon this 
single fact.  
Officer McFadden was never sure which store was the subject of the 
suspects’ attention.  At the suppression hearing he admitted he had no 
experience in observing the activities of individuals who were “casing” a 
store for a robbery.  In the police report, Officer McFadden indicated that 




they were looking in an airline ticket office; at the suppression hearing, 
the Detective mentioned an airline office or a jewelry store.79 
 
In light of these facts—McFadden’s inability to explain why he was initially 
suspicious of the men, the ever-changing number of trips the men made up and 
down the street, and the uncertainty of the type of store into which the men were 
looking—the reasonableness of the initial stop appears to be more open to debate 
than the Terry decision suggests.  The failure of the Court to address the 
questionable reasonableness of the stop in Terry illustrates how the very 
foundation of the reasonable suspicion standard in American constitutional law 
masks racially disparate stop-and-frisk practices with the cloak of race-neutrality.80 
 
B. Racial Issues Throughout American Policing 
 
Police scholars George Kelling and Mark Moore developed a widely cited 
historical framework that contextualizes 150 years of police history into three eras: 
political, reform, and community problem-solving. 81   Though the Kelling and 
Moore framework is useful for examining police history, it has been criticized for 
overlooking the role of racism in professional policing.  Hubert Williams and 
Patrick Murphy, for example, argue that the origins of American policing are 
rooted in slave patrols in the South, and that the advances that have occurred 
through the “reform” and “community problem-solving” eras excluded minority 
citizens.82  In effect, as policing progressed through the political, professional and 
community problem-solving eras, the minority community was left behind.  
Williams and Murphy referred to this as the “minority view” of policing. 
Kelling and Moore published their framework in the late 1980s, but the 
experiences of numerous agencies with stop-and-frisk suggest that Williams and 
Murphy’s “minority view” of policing is still a stark reality.  The Philadelphia 
Police Department (PPD) stopped more than 250,000 citizens in 2009, prompting 
the American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania (ACLU-PA) to file a federal 
lawsuit in November 2010.83  The lawsuit, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, alleged 
that the PPD was engaged in racial profiling.  The litigation resulted in a settlement 
agreement between the plaintiffs and the Philadelphia Police Department that 
centered on quarterly analysis of stop data by the ACLU-PA, appointment of an 
                                                                                                                            
 
79  Katz, supra note 12, at 430–32 (footnotes omitted). 
80  See McAffee, supra note 12, at 612–13; Maclin, supra note 12, at 1278–79. 
81  George L. Kelling & Mark H. Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing, 4 PERSPECTIVES 
ON POLICING 2 (1988), http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/114213.pdf. 
82  Hubert Williams & Patrick V. Murphy, The Evolving Strategy of Police: A Minority View, 
13 PERSPECTIVES ON POLICING 1 (1990), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/121019.pdf. 
83  Complaint at 21, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 210CV05952, 2010 WL 4662865 
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/669/198/. 
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independent monitor, retraining of officers, and new protocols governing stop-and-
frisk practices. 84   The ACLU-PA subsequently reported to the court and the 
settlement monitor that although the number of stops had declined by 15%,85 there 
had been 
 
no significant improvement in the quality of stops and frisks.  By our 
analysis, pedestrian stops are being made without reasonable suspicion in 
approximately 43–47% of the cases . . . . Frisks are being conducted 
without reasonable suspicion in over 45% of the cases . . . . By race, 76% 
of the stops were of minorities (African-Americans and Latinos) and 
85% of the frisks were of minorities.  The findings as to impermissible 
stops and frisks are particularly disturbing given the fact that the Police 
Department had the time and resources following the entry of the 
Agreement to re-train its officers on stop and frisk practices and to 
establish supervisory reviews to ensure accountability for practices that 
failed to meet clear mandates under the Agreement.86 
 
The ACLU-PA’s most recent report (as of the writing of this article) 
continues to raise questions about the PPD’s use of Terry stops.  The 2015 report 
found that 37% of stops lacked reasonable suspicion; contraband was only found in 
2% of stops and 5% of frisks; and blacks comprised approximately 72% and 79% 
of all stops and frisks, respectively, while they made up only 43% of 
Philadelphia’s population.87  
In 2013, the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU-NJ) 
evaluated six months of stop-and-frisk practices in Newark.  According to the 
ACLU-NJ, the Newark Police Department conducted an average of 2,093 stops per 
month from July to December 2013.88  The authors note that this translates to a rate 
of 91 stops per 1,000 residents, a stop rate that was eleven times greater than the 
NYPD stop rate during the same time period. 89   The ACLU-NJ report also 
discovered racial disproportionality in stops, as Blacks represented 52% of the 
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population but 75% of those who were stopped by Newark police. 90   An 
investigation into Terry stops by the Miami Gardens Police Department found that, 
from 2008–2013, officers had stopped 65,328 individuals, and nearly 1,000 
citizens had been stopped 10 or more times. 91   In 2015, the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Illinois (ACLU-IL) published a report claiming that the 
Chicago Police Department had “failed to train, supervise and monitor law 
enforcement in minority communities for decades, resulting in a failure to ensure 
that officers’ use of stop and frisk is lawful.”92  These stop-and-frisk stories are 
consistent with Williams and Murphy’s “minority view” and demonstrate the 
perpetuation of the undercurrent of racial injustice in American policing.93 
Also consider the highly publicized deaths of Eric Garner, Michael Brown, 
and Freddie Gray—all of which involved Terry stops.  On July 17, 2014, NYPD 
officers approached Eric Garner on a street corner in Staten Island because they 
suspected that he was selling unlicensed cigarettes.94  The incident was captured on 
a bystander’s cell phone.  After brief questioning, officers attempted to take 
Garner, a 400-pound man, into custody.  During the struggle, Officer Daniel 
Pantaleo applied a chokehold and Garner can be heard stating nearly a dozen times 
that he cannot breathe.  Garner lost consciousness after the struggle; he was 
pronounced dead an hour later.  Five months later, a grand jury refused to indict 
Officer Pantaleo, sparking waves of protests.95 
On August 9, 2014, Ferguson police officer Darren Wilson observed Michael 
Brown and Dorian Johnson walking in the middle of the street.  There is no video 
of the incident and the facts are disputed, but what is clear is that the initial stop of 
Brown and Johnson led to a struggle between Wilson, who was still seated in his 
patrol car, and Brown, who was next to the car.96  Physical evidence supports 
Officer Wilson’s assertion that there was a struggle over Wilson’s gun and that one 
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shot was fired while he was still in his car.97  Wilson got out of the patrol car and 
fired several more shots that killed Michael Brown.  Officer Wilson claimed that 
Brown had turned and was charging at him.  Other testimony indicated that Brown 
had his hands up and was posing no threat to Wilson.98  Protests and civil disorder 
began shortly after Brown’s death and continued for several days.  On August 16, 
2014, Missouri Governor Jay Nixon declared a state of emergency in Ferguson.  
On November 24, 2014, a grand jury declined to indict Officer Wilson for Michael 
Brown’s death.99  
On April 12, 2015, Baltimore police officers attempted to stop and question 
Freddie Gray.  Gray fled from the officers, but he was quickly taken into custody 
and arrested for possessing an illegal switchblade.  During his transport in a police 
van, Gray slipped into a coma and died several days later on April 19th. 100  
Autopsy findings indicate that Gray died from injuries to his spinal cord. 101  
Though there are questions about whether force was used during the arrest, 
Baltimore Police Commissioner Anthony Batts acknowledged that Freddie Gray 
was not properly secured during the van transport.  Protests and civil disorder 
erupted after Gray’s death.  On May 1, 2015, six officers were charged with 
Freddie Gray’s death by the State Attorney’s Office, and on May 21, 2015, a grand 
jury indicted the six officers.102  A mistrial was declared in the first trial of one of 
the officers after the jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict.103 
The numerous allegations of racial profiling that have emerged in the wake of 
stop-and-frisk programs, and the deaths of Eric Garner, Michael Brown, and 
Freddie Gray demonstrate the persistent undercurrent of racial injustice in 
American policing—or what Williams and Murphy termed the “minority view” of 
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policing.104  Although many U.S. cities continue to struggle with racial and ethnic 
tensions in police-citizen relationships, the unique ways in which stop-and-frisk 
was implemented in New York contributed to that particular city having one of the 
most vexing and persistent problems with policing communities of color. 
 
IV. STOP-AND-FRISK AND THE NYPD 
 
The NYPD story demonstrates how use of stop-and-frisk as a widespread 
crime-control strategy can go terribly wrong, leading to the violation of the 
constitutional rights of thousands of mostly minority New York City residents for 
a period of nearly twenty years.  The story represents a collision between a 
constitutionally permissible tactic used in an unconstitutional manner, the 
persistent undercurrent of racial injustice in policing, and an effort to use federal 
civil litigation as a mechanism to force police reform.  The next section describes 
how this collision developed. 
 
A. Crime, Disorder, and Broken Windows 
 
New York City, like many cities across the United States, experienced a 
major spike in violence, crime, and disorder in the 1980s.105  Much of the violence 
in New York was driven by the emergence of crack cocaine and competition for 
the drug market.106  Homicides climbed steadily from 1,392 in 1985 to 2,262 in 
1990.107  At the same time, the city and subway system were struggling with 
rampant social and physical disorder.108  Marijuana, heroin, cocaine, and crack 
cocaine were regularly and openly being sold on street corners, blocks, and city 
parks. 109   Kelling and Coles estimated that “[a]pproximately 1,200 to 2,000 
persons a night” were sleeping in the subway system.110 
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The New York Transit Authority appointed William Bratton as chief of the 
transit police to address crime and disorder in the subway system.111  Chief Bratton 
partnered with criminologist George Kelling to develop an enforcement strategy 
(based on Wilson and Kelling’s “broken windows” theory112) that targeted low-
level offenses (e.g., turnstile jumping), as well as social and physical disorder 
through frequent arrests and removals from the subway system. 113   Broken 
windows theory posits that minor forms of social and physical disorder cause a 
breakdown in informal social control as citizen investment in an area 
diminishes.114  As citizens withdraw from the area, the level of disorder increases 
and the risk for more serious types of crime to emerge becomes greater.115  The 
theory suggests that police focus enforcement efforts on disorder and quality-of-
life offenses as a mechanism for reengaging law-abiding citizens’ commitment to 
the area.116  Under Chief Bratton, the transit police adopted a broken windows-
based strategy in the subway system.  Over the next two years, the level of disorder 
dropped dramatically, and felony offenses declined by 30%.117  
In 1993, New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani appointed William Bratton 
as the Commissioner of the NYPD, and Bratton immediately began 
implementation of a broken-windows based strategy throughout New York. 118  
Two policy initiatives defined the NYPD crime-control strategy.  First, Reclaiming 
the Public Spaces of New York outlined the broken windows theory and articulated 
an order maintenance strategy that targeted disorder and quality-of-life offenses 
through systematic and aggressive enforcement strategies (e.g., replicating the 
subway strategy).119  Second, Getting Guns off the Streets of New York120 outlined 
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the NYPD’s strategy to reduce gun violence through the seizure of illegal firearms 
and through the intensive investigation of gun-related incidents.121  
Stop-and-frisk emerged as the primary tactic to meet the objectives of both 
policy initiatives.122  Over the next several years, critics argued that police over-
enforced quality-of-life infractions through a zero-tolerance approach because 
officers could easily justify the stops under the reasonable suspicion standard.123  
As Waldeck states, there is not “any doubt that the police use quality-of-life 
offenses as excuses to fish for drugs, guns, or evidence of a more serious crime.”124  
The effects of the stop-and-frisk program were immediate.  From 1993 to 1996, 
arrests rose by 23%, including a 40% increase in misdemeanor arrests and a 97% 
increase in drug arrests.125  The NYPD made approximately 40,000 gun-related 
arrests over a three-year period, resulting in the removal of more than 50,000 guns 
from the streets.126  Stop-and-frisk also produced a large increase in arrests for 
marijuana possession.  In 2006, Geller and Fagan reported that there were 32,000 
arrests for marijuana possession, marking a 500% increase from the previous 
decade.127 
The NYPD’s use of stop-and-frisk increased steadily in the late 1990s into the 
twenty-first century.  In 2003, for example, NYPD officers conducted more than 
160,000 stop-and-frisks of citizens.128  In 2003, the NYPD implemented Operation 
Impact, a hot spots strategy where police commanders identified twenty four high-
crime “Impact Zones” that would be targeted with “saturation foot patrol in 
combination with resources from a variety of departmental divisions.”129  Stop-
and-frisk activity increased dramatically over the next several years, peaking at 
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more than 685,000 in 2011.130  As the frequency of stops increased, critics attacked 
the strategy’s low rates of return.  Jones-Brown and colleagues found that of the 
540,320 stops in 2008, just 6% (32,206 stops) resulted in an arrest and an 
additional 6.4% (34,802 stops) resulted in a summons; thus, the percentage of 
“innocent stops”—those not resulting in summons or arrest—accounted for 
roughly 87.6%.131  Similarly, the percentage of stops resulting in the recovery of a 
gun dropped by 60% from 0.39% (627 guns recovered out of a total of 160,851 
stops) in 2003 to 0.15% in 2008 (824 guns recovered out of a total of 540,320 
stops). 132   Furthermore, the percentage of citizen complaints involving stops 
increased from 24.6% in 2004 to 32.7% in 2008.133 
As the use of stop-and-frisk expanded dramatically, the NYPD drifted away 
from the central tenets of broken windows theory, and the program devolved into a 
strictly zero-tolerance approach against social disorder such as public drunkenness, 
vandalism, loitering, panhandling, prostitution, and the like.134  In other words, 
rather than focusing on the “amelioration of physical disorder” in partnership with 
the community, the NYPD focused on “interdiction of social disorder.”135  These 
efforts led the NYPD to implement a set of practices that encouraged the 
aggressive pursuit of individuals through stop-and-frisks, rather than mutually 
beneficial interactions with law-abiding citizens.136  This zero-tolerance mentality 
compounded the police department’s disconnect from the community in a number 
of important ways.  First, the NYPD focused less on preventing disorder and 
alternatives to arrest, and more on aggressively removing weapons and wanted 
criminals from the community.137  Second, the NYPD de-emphasized informal 
interactions between police and the community in the manner advocated by both 
community policing principles and broken windows theory.138  The lack of police-
community engagement was driven in large part by the management style that 
Bratton embraced from the private sector. 139   This management style stressed 
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innovative approaches on management accountability, prioritization, and data-
driven decision-making.140  One of the primary structural modifications to emerge 
from this management system was Compstat, a system “defined by timely and 
accurate information, rapid deployment of resources, effective tactics, follow-up, 
and assessment.”141  Essentially, instead of identifying community needs through 
engagement with residents, the NYPD determined community needs through its 
own data-driven accountability system (i.e., Compstat). 
 
B. Crime Control Benefits 
 
During the same time that the NYPD implemented its order-maintenance 
strategy to target disorder, illegal gun carrying, and crime (with stop-and-frisk as a 
central feature), the city witnessed a large, prolonged drop in crime.  From the 
mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, street crime in New York City declined 
approximately 75%—a decrease roughly twice the national average.142  In 2007, 
there were 496 homicides in New York, down from more than 2,200 in 1990.  
Proponents of stop-and-frisk point to New York City’s crime decline over the 
last two decades as evidence that the tactic is effective.  For example, former 
NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly touted stop-and-frisk at a news conference  
by saying: 
 
Police stops are just one component of multiple efforts by the 
Department that have saved lives and driven the murder rate to record 
lows.  In the first 11 years of Mayor Bloomberg’s tenure there were 
7,363 fewer murders in New York City compared to the 11 years prior to 
the Mayor taking office.143 
 
Former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg similarly praised the 
effectiveness of stop-and-frisk in combatting crime, stating: “New York is the 
safest big city in the nation, and our crime reductions have been steeper than any 
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other big city’s.  For instance, if New York City had the murder rate of 
Washington, D.C., 761 more New Yorkers would have been killed last year.”144 
Whether stop-and-frisk caused or contributed to the crime decline in New 
York City is a hotly contested proposition.145  Several studies have suggested a 
causal connection.  Corman and Mocan reported that misdemeanor arrests were 
associated with declines in robbery, motor vehicle theft, and grand larceny, but not 
homicide, assault, burglary, and rape.146  Similarly, Kelling and Sousa found that 
misdemeanor arrest levels were significantly associated with reductions in violent 
crime, while controlling for several relevant community factors.147  Smith and 
Purtell found that Operation Impact had a significant effect on crimes-against-
persons in Impact Zones.148  Smith and Purtell also examined the effects of stop-
and-frisk on crime in New York, and they found that there was a significant 
inverse relationship between stop rates and robbery, burglary, motor vehicle theft, 
and homicides rates.149  Zimring argued that New York’s crime decline from 1990 
through 2009 was largely attributable to the NYPD’s policing practices.150 
Conversely, there are a number of studies indicating that the relationship 
between stop-and-frisk and the crime decline in New York City is modest at 
best.151  For instance, Rosenfeld and Fornango found that police stops did not 
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decrease robbery and burglary rates.152  In a re-analysis of Kelling and Sousa’s 
data, Harcourt and Ludwig found no significant relationships between policing 
minor disorder offenses and New York City’s crime decline.153  MacDonald and 
colleagues conducted a comprehensive examination of the crime effects of 
Operation Impact (with a specific focus on stop-and-frisk).  They concluded: 
 
Impact zones were significantly associated with reductions in total 
reported crimes, assaults, burglaries, drug violations, misdemeanor 
crimes, felony property crimes, robberies, and felony violent crimes.  
Impact zones were significantly associated with increases in total 
reported arrests, arrests for burglary, arrests for weapons, arrests for 
misdemeanor crimes, and arrests for property felony crimes.  Impact 
zones were also significantly associated with increases in investigative 
stops for suspected crimes, but only the increase in stops made based on 
probable cause indicators of criminal behaviors were associated with 
crime reductions.  The largest increase in investigative stops in impact 
zones was based on indicators of suspicious behavior that had no 
measurable effect on crime.  The findings suggest that saturating high 
crime blocks with police helped reduce crime in New York City, but that 
the bulk of the investigative stops did not play an important role in the 
crime reductions.  The findings indicate that crime reduction can be 
achieved with more focused investigative stops.154 
 
C. The Social Costs 
 
Regardless of the impact on crime, there is considerable evidence 
demonstrating that the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program exacted significant social 
costs that were disproportionately experienced by ethnic minorities.  By the end of 
the 1990s, stop-and-frisk had become a point of contention among ethnic 
minorities.  A Vera Institute of Justice study examined the experiences of more 
than 500 people who had been stopped by the NYPD:  
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1)  44% of young people surveyed indicated they had been stopped 
repeatedly—9 times or more. 
2)  Less than a third—29%—reported ever being informed of the reason 
for a stop. 
3)  71% of young people surveyed reported being frisked at least once, 
and 64% said they had been searched. 
4)  45% reported encountering an officer who threatened them, and 46% 
said they had experienced physical force at the hands of an officer. 
5)  One out of four said they were involved in a stop in which the officer 
displayed his or her weapon. 
6)  61% stated that the way police acted towards them was influenced by 
their age. 
7)  51% indicated that they were treated worse than others because of 
their race and/or ethnicity.155 
 
A study by Fagan and colleagues on stop-and-frisk in New York City identified 
three noteworthy findings: 
 
First, stops within neighborhoods take place at rates in excess of what 
would be predicted from the separate and combined effects of population 
demography, physical and social conditions, and the crime rate.  This 
excess seems to be concentrated in predominately Black neighborhoods.  
Second, the excess stops in these neighborhoods persist over time, even 
as the Black population declines, crime rates remain low and effectively 
unchanged, the City’s overall social and economic health improves, and 
housing and other investments increase across the City’s neighborhoods, 
including its poorest and most segregated neighborhoods.  Third, there 
appears to be a declining return in crime detection from marginal 
increases in enforcement, and this efficiency gap seems to grow over 
time.156  
 
The racial focus of the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program was acknowledged 
(and minimized) by city and police department leaders.157  Former Mayor Michael 
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Bloomberg stated publicly that, according to the department’s statistics on violent 
crime suspects, “we disproportionately stop whites too much and minorities too 
little.”158  In 2013, an officer in the 40th precinct recorded his commanding officer 
directing him to stop “the right people, at the right time, at the right location,” 
described as “male blacks, 14 to 20, 21.”159  The Center for Constitutional Rights 
(CCR) interviewed 54 people who had been subjected to stop-and-frisk in order to 
paint a clearer picture of the “human impact” of the stop-and-frisk program.  The 
CCR concluded: 
 
These interviews provide evidence of how deeply this practice impacts 
individuals and they document widespread civil and human rights abuses 
. . . . The effects of these abuses can be devastating and often leave 
behind lasting emotional, psychological, social, and economic harm. . . . 
Residents of some New York City neighborhoods describe a police 
presence so pervasive and hostile that they feel like they are living in a 
state of siege.160 
 
The overt racially charged statements by city and police leaders, along with clear 
racial disproportionality in the administration of the stop-and-frisk program, 
illustrates the persistent undercurrent of racial injustice in New York City policing, 
and provides an important backdrop for the federal litigation accusing the NYPD 
of racially-discriminatory policing. 
 
V. FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICE REFORM 
 
Given the decentralized nature of law enforcement in the United States, the 
federal courts are often called upon to address allegations of widespread 
unconstitutional police practices, such as discriminatory stop-and-frisk practices.161  
There are several avenues through which federal court relief from unconstitutional 
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police practices can be pursued, the two most frequently used of which are civil 
lawsuits filed pursuant to either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 42 U.S.C. § 14141. 
 
A. Section 1983  
 
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides civil and criminal 
remedies for individuals whose constitutional rights are violated by persons acting 
under state authority.162  Enacted largely in response to growing domestic terrorism 
by the Ku Klux Klan, the Act provides: 
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress[.]163 
 
Section 1983, introduced by Rep. Samuel Shellabarger (R., Ohio), “was the subject 
of only limited debate and was swiftly passed without amendment.”164  Its primary 
purpose was to provide a mechanism for private persons to enforce the rights 
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.165  Although it has been amended a few 
times since its passage, the language of the Act today remains “essentially 
unchanged” from the original.166  
Section 1983 was hardly used from the time of its enactment until the early 
1960s.167  In 1961, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape.168  That case 
upheld the authority of the plaintiff to use § 1983 as a jurisdictional basis for suing 
police officers who had allegedly conducted an illegal search of his home in 
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167 Robert C. Harrall, Prisoners’ Section 1983 Cases: A Study of Palmigiano v. Garrahy 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Connecticut). 
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violation of the Fourth Amendment.169  Notably, the Court refused to allow the 
lawsuit to proceed against the City of Chicago as the employer of the officers, 
reasoning that Congress had not intended the word “person” in § 1983 to apply to 
municipalities. 170   Of particular relevance to this article, however, the Court 
reversed itself on this key issue in the 1978 case of Monell v. Department of Social 
Services of the City of New York:171  
 
Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 
1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and 
other local government units to be included among those persons to 
whom § 1983 applies.  Local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued 
directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief 
where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional 
implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or 
decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.  
Moreover, although the touchstone of the § 1983 action against a 
government body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a 
deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution, local governments, 
like every other § 1983 “person,” by the very terms of the statute, may be 
sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental 
“custom” even though such a custom has not received formal approval 
through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.172 
 
Importantly, municipal practices and customs are so broadly defined in Monell that 
the terms include whatever the agency does routinely, whether stated in official 
policy or not, such that the practice amounts to a custom or usage that is 
tantamount to formal law or policy.173 
If a number of people have been aggrieved by state actors whose conduct falls 
within a municipal policy, practice, or custom, those plaintiffs’ § 1983 lawsuits 
may be certified as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(2).174  Such class action lawsuits play a critical role in the enforcement of 
civil rights.  If the plaintiffs are able to establish the requirements to be certified as 
                                                                                                                            
 
169 Id. at 191–92. 
170 Id. at 187–92. 
171 436 U.S. 658. 
172 Id. at 690–91. 
173 See, e.g., MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 97 (3d ed. 2014); see also City 
of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 
144, 167–68 (1970)).  
174 See, e.g., William A. Margeson, Bringing the Gavel Down on Stops and Frisks: The 
Equitable Regulation of Police Power, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 739, 756 (2014). 
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a class, as they were in Floyd, they can present evidence to the court and seek 
federal injunctive relief against a law enforcement agency.175 
Perhaps because § 1983 claims against municipalities can seek both injunctive 
relief and monetary remedies, the decision in Monell led to a dramatic increase in 
civil litigation against police because it “opened the ‘deep pockets’ of government 
treasuries to civil rights plaintiffs.”176  For example, from 1986–1990, the City of 
Los Angeles paid more than $20 million in civil litigation against police officers.177  
In 2001, the State of New Jersey paid $12.95 million to plaintiffs in a racial 
profiling lawsuit against the New Jersey State Police.178  Professors Marc Miller 
and Ronald Wright reported that although some of these settlements garner intense 
media attention, municipalities quietly settle many more lawsuits than people 
generally assume, the majority of which involve “secret settlements” that are filed 
under seal.179 
There have been few evaluations of the impact of § 1983 lawsuits on police 
misconduct.180  Criminologist Candace McCoy argues that federal lawsuits have 
led to improved police practices because of the unique role of insurance carriers.181  
That is, in the wake of the Monell ruling, many law enforcement agencies sought 
to reduce their exposure to lawsuits by securing liability insurance. 182   “But 
insurance companies would not offer attractively priced policies if police agencies 
could not demonstrate that they had done everything possible to reduce the risk of 
lawsuits.”183  Insurance companies began devising risk management protocols for 
                                                                                                                            
 
175 Angelo N. Ancheta, Defendant Class Actions and Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 33 
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for the use of deadly force in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).  Abraham Tennenbaum 
examined the effects of the Garner decision on use of deadly force nationwide and concluded that it 
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CRIMINOLOGY 241, 257 (1994). 
181 Candace McCoy, How Civil Rights Lawsuits Improve American Policing, in HOLDING 
POLICE ACCOUNTABLE 111, 112 (Candace McCoy ed., 2010). 
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police that specified mandates for training, policy, and supervision that met 
national standards.184  McCoy notes that § 1983 litigation,  
 
coupled with the professional risk management skills and oversight of 
the private insurance industry, have not been given the credit they 
deserve.  This accountability device has probably been the source of the 
most far-reaching yet deep reforms in American policing over the past 
three decades.185  
 
B. Section 14141 
 
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) also plays an important role in 
addressing police misconduct that violates citizens’ federally protected civil rights.  
In 1994, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 14141 as part of the Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act.186  This law is often referred to as “the Rodney King 
Law” because Congress enacted it in the wake of widespread media broadcasts of 
videotaped footage of real and significant police brutality against Rodney King at 
the hands of Los Angeles Police Department officers.187  The statute provides as 
follows: 
 
(a)  Unlawful conduct 
It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent 
thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to 
engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers or 
by officials or employees of any governmental agency with 
responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the 
incarceration of juveniles that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States. 
(b)  Civil action by Attorney General 
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that 
a violation of paragraph (1) has occurred, the Attorney General, for or in 
the name of the United States, may in a civil action obtain appropriate 
equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice.188  
 
                                                                                                                            
 
184 Id. at 144–46. 
185 Id. at 150.  
186 Pub. L. No. 103–322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
187 See, e.g., David M. Jaros, Preempting the Police, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1149, 1159–60 (2014) 
(describing legislative action following the Rodney King beating); Stephen Rushin, Using Data to 
Reduce Police Violence, 57 B.C. L. REV. 117 (2016). 
188 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012). 
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Unlike § 1983, which provides a private right of action, § 14141 authorizes 
the U.S. Attorney General to initiate structural reform litigation (SRL) against 
local police departments found to have engaged in systemic misconduct.189  The 
§ 14141 process begins with case selection, wherein the DOJ typically relies upon 
media reports, existing litigation, “whistleblowers” within police departments, 
academic reports, or information from other federal government agencies in order 
to identify departments who may be engaged in systematic misconduct.190  The 
Civil Rights Division conducts a preliminary inquiry to determine if the nature and 
extent of the alleged problem for a given department warrants a more thorough 
investigation. 191   Based on the results of the preliminary investigation, a 
department may then be subjected to a formal inquiry by the Special Litigation 
Section of the Civil Rights Division (involving extensive internal investigation of a 
particular department that may take years and cost millions of dollars).192  If a 
pattern or practice of civil rights violations is found during the formal inquiry, the 
DOJ issues a technical assistance letter or an investigative findings letter that 
details the unconstitutional police practices and the evidence supporting the 
conclusions.193  The DOJ and the agency then begin settlement negotiations over 
reforms to be enacted to prevent official litigation in federal court.194  If the DOJ 
and the agency cannot negotiate a settlement, the DOJ files suit in federal court.  
Successful negotiations between the DOJ and municipalities, either before or 
after a formal § 14141 lawsuit is filed, typically lead to either a consent decree or 
memorandum of agreement.195  The consent decree outlines the remedies that must 
                                                                                                                            
 
189 Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 MINN. 
L. REV. 1343, 1347 (2015). 
190 Rushin, supra note 161, at 3220–24. 
191 Id. at 3219–26. 
192 Id. at 3224–29; see also Rushin, supra note 189, at 1370–71. 
193 Rushin, supra note 161, at 3228–29; see also Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights 
Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 16 (2009). 
194 Rushin, supra note 161, at 3228; see also POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 161, 
at 27. 
195 It is important to note that until relatively recently, settlements have been the norm, but this 
may be changing—perhaps as the defendants realize what it might cost to comply.  Consider, for 
example, that Alamance, North Carolina, went to trial on a § 14141 claim and prevailed (although the 
DOJ is appealing).  Michael D. Abernethy, Judge Dismisses DOJ Case Against Johnson, Finds No 
Evidence of Unconstitutional Practices, TIMES-NEWS (Aug. 7, 2015), 
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participated in negotiations for a consent decree, but subsequently withdrew from the agreement.  
Matt Ford, United States v. Ferguson: Attorney General Loretta Lynch Announced the Justice 
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ATLANTIC (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/doj-ferguson-
lawsuit/462300/.  As a result, DOJ filed suit against Ferguson in February 2016; as of this writing, 
Ferguson contests the substantive allegations that the municipality has engaged in “a pattern or 




be implemented to address the unconstitutional behavior by officers.  The DOJ and 
the municipality select an external monitor to oversee the agency’s progress 
towards achieving compliance with the consent decree.196  
A consent decree is typically designed to last five years, though federal 
oversight often lasts much longer.  For example, the Los Angeles Police 
Department was under consent decree for nine years.  The Detroit Police 
Department was under consent decree for nearly 14 years.  And some agencies, 
such as the Cleveland Division of Police, have been under consent decree twice.  
Since 1994, the DOJ has initiated approximately 55 formal inquiries of law 
enforcement agencies under the authority of § 14141, leading to 24 settlements or 
consent decrees.197  
Most § 14141 consent decrees have targeted unconstitutional patterns or 
practices involving use of force and racially discriminatory policing in stops, 
searches, and arrests.  Consent decrees include a wide range of remedies that 
address policies, procedures, training, supervision, implementation of early 
intervention/risk management systems, enhanced data collection and analysis, 
more robust citizen complaint procedures, and adoption of community 
outreach/community-oriented policing initiatives.198 
There are very few evaluations of § 14141 consent decrees.  A Vera Institute 
of Justice study from 2005 by Davis, Henderson, and Ortiz assessed the 
sustainability of consent decree reform efforts one year after the termination of the 
consent decree for the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police.199  Kupferberg examined data 
on the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), the New Jersey State Troopers, 
and the New York City Police Department (Daniels case) to assess whether the 
consent decrees for each department affected racial disparities in stops, arrests, and 
other types of police activity.200  Schatmeier identified key features associated with 
                                                                                                                            
practice of law enforcement conduct that violates the Constitution and federal civil rights laws” and 
is, therefore, actively defending the litigation.  Id.   
196 POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 161, at 29–31.  
197 Rushin, supra note 161, at 3247; Rushin, supra note 189, at 1377; see also Darrell L. Ross 
& Patricia A. Parke, Policing by Consent Decree: An Analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 14141 and the New 
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POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 25–26 (2d ed. 2014); Michael D. White, Preventing Racially Biased 
Policing Through Internal and External Controls: The Comprehensive Accountability Package, in 
RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL READINGS 468, 480 (Stephen K. Rice & 
Michael D. White eds., 2010); Debra Livingston, Police Reform and The Department of Justice: An 
Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815 (1999). 
198 See Rushin, supra note 189, at 1383–84, 1401–03; POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra 
note 161, passim. 
199 ROBERT DAVIS, NICOLE HENDERSON & CHRISTOPHER ORTIZ, CAN FEDERAL INTERVENTION 
BRING LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLICING?: THE PITTSBURGH CONSENT DECREE 4 (2005), 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/277_530.pdf.  
200 Noah Kupferberg, Transparency: A New Role for Police Consent Decrees, 42 COLUM. J.L. 
& SOC. PROBS. 129, 129 (2008). 
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the implementation of the consent decree for the Cincinnati Police Department.201  
Stone, Foglesong, and Cole evaluated the LAPD’s consent decree using 
observational methods, focus groups, and quantitative analysis of administrative 
data.202  Chanin conducted a longitudinal analysis to assess whether consent decree 
reforms were associated with sustainable change in citizen complaints, police use 
of force incidents, and civil litigation in Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, and the District of 
Columbia.203  Chanin also examined data from stakeholder interviews and monitor 
reports to assess the implementation of consent decrees in Pittsburgh, Detroit, 
Washington, D.C., Cincinnati, and Prince George’s County, Maryland.204  
A number of themes emerge from a close reading of this handful of consent 
decree studies.  First, officers view consent decrees skeptically, and federal 
oversight negatively affects officer morale.205  Second, though officers frequently 
suggested that the consent decree led to less proactive police work, results from 
several studies showed increased levels of summons, stops, and arrests during the 
consent decree.206  Third, there is modest evidence that both use of force207 and 
citizen complaints208  decrease during consent decrees, though research has not 
demonstrated that excessive or unlawful force declined during federal oversight.  
Fourth, there is also some evidence to suggest that public satisfaction with police 
increases as a result of consent decrees.209  Alternatively, several studies have 
shown that racial disparities in stops and arrests persisted despite federal 
oversight. 210   The dearth of research on consent decrees and their impact is 
troubling given their significant cost.  For example, the consent decree for the 
LAPD is estimated to have cost between $30 and $50 million annually (totaling 
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$250 million over five years), and the Cincinnati Police Department consent decree 
entailed $13 million in start-up costs alone.211  
 
C. Federal Civil Litigation over the NYPD’s Stop-and-Frisk Program 
 
The widespread deployment stop-and-frisk by the NYPD resulted in two 
major § 1983 lawsuits alleging racial profiling.  In 1999, the Center for 
Constitutional Rights (CCR) filed a class action lawsuit against the NYPD, 
Daniels v. City of New York, alleging that NYPD officers were selectively 
targeting individuals on the basis of their race and national origin, without 
reasonable suspicion, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution.212  Of particular concern was the NYPD’s Street Crime Unit 
(SCU), a plainclothes unit comprised of more than 300 officers, several of whom 
were responsible for killing Amadou Diallo in February 1999.213  The death of 
Diallo ignited citywide demonstrations against police brutality, and the SCU unit 
was eventually disbanded in 2002.214  In September 2003, the NYPD and CCR 
agreed to settle the civil suit through an out-of-court consent decree approved by 
Judge Shira Scheindlin (who would eventually preside over the Floyd case).215  As 
part of the consent decree, the NYPD agreed to: maintain a written anti-racial 
profiling policy; train officers on legal issues in stop-and-frisk (and cultural 
diversity); require that officers record stop data on a UF-250 form; conduct audits 
of the UF-250 forms; and maintain an electronic database of stops (based on the 
UF-250 forms) that would be provided quarterly to plaintiffs.216 
The Daniels settlement did not include an independent monitor, and the 
evidence suggests that the NYPD’s compliance with the consent decree was 
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mixed, at best.217  As a result, the CCR filed a second class-action lawsuit against 
the NYPD in 2008, Floyd v. City of New York,218 as well as a new companion case 
in Daniels.219  The Floyd case proceeded to trial in early 2013, again under Judge 
Shira Scheindlin.  The allegations against the NYPD were supported by the expert 
reports of Criminologist Jeffrey Fagan, 220  as well as analyses carried out by 
CCR.221  Fagan’s expert reports in the Floyd case analyzed the NYPD’s stop-and-
frisk data from 2004 through 2009, and from January 2010 through June 2012.  
After controlling for crime, neighborhood context, and the concentration of police 
officers in specific areas, Fagan found that Blacks and Latinos were still 
disproportionately targeted by the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program, in support of 
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Table 1. Summary of Dr. Jeffrey Fagan’s Statistical Findings  
for the Floyd Litigation 
 
Fourth Amendment Claims 
x    Nearly 150,000, or 6.71% of all discretionary stops lack legal justification. 
An additional 544,252, or 24.37% of all discretionary stops lack 
sufficiently detailed documentation to assess their legality. 
x    Officers rely heavily on two constitutionally problematic stop justifications 
for nearly half of all stops: furtive movements and proximity to a high 
crime area. 
x    Documented stop justifications do little to explain overall variations in stop 
patterns and do not substantially influence the racial disparities that 
characterize stop practices between police precincts. 
x    The rate of gun seizure is 0.15%, or nearly zero, and arrests take place in 
less than 6% of all stops. 
x    Black and Hispanic suspects are treated more harshly once the decision is 
made that a crime has occurred. Black and Hispanic suspects are more 
likely to be arrested than issued a summons when compared to White 
suspects. They are more likely to be subjected to use of force.  
Fourteenth Amendment Claims 
x    NYPD stop activity is concentrated in precincts with high concentrations 
of Black and Hispanic residents even after controlling for the influences of 
crime, social conditions, and the allocation of police resources. 
x    NYPD stops are significantly more frequent for Black and Hispanic 
citizens than for white citizens, even after adjusting for precinct crime 
rates, the racial composition, and other social and economic factors 
predictive of police activity. 
x    Black and Hispanics are more likely to be stopped than whites even in 
areas where there are low crime rates and where residential populations are 
racially heterogeneous or predominantly White.  
  
In August 2013, Judge Scheindlin ruled that the NYPD was engaging in 
unconstitutional stop-and-frisk practices that targeted predominately Black and 
Latino New Yorkers.223  In a separate decision, Judge Scheindlin ordered several 
remedies to address the NYPD’s racially discriminatory stop-and-frisk program.224  
She appointed an independent monitor to oversee compliance with the remedies, 
which included reformation of policies, training, supervision, documentation, and 
disciplinary action, as well as the publication of monitor reports that detail the 
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NYPD’s compliance with the ordered reforms.225  Judge Scheindlin also ruled that 
the citizens most affected by stop-and-frisk should play a role in the reforms, and 
that the NYPD begin a one-year pilot study of body-worn cameras in the seventy-
fifth precinct. 226 
Events continued to unfold in New York City in the months following the 
landmark Floyd ruling.  First, the City appealed Judge Scheindlin’s ruling to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and sought a stay of her remedies, 
pending the outcome of the appeal.  The appellate court granted the City’s motion 
for a stay pending appeal. 227   The Second Circuit also determined that Judge 
Scheindlin had failed to avoid the appearance of impartiality and therefore ordered 
her removal from the case.228  Importantly, though, the Second Circuit did not 
overturn the substance of Judge Scheindlin’s rulings.  
Second, several police unions filed motions to intervene in the appeal alleging 
that Judge Scheindlin had erred in her interpretations of evidence and the law.229  
The police union motions were denied on multiple grounds, including being 
untimely, and the unions having “no significant protectable interests relating to the 
subject of the litigation that would warrant intervention.”230 
Third, the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program (and the Floyd case) became a 
defining feature of the New York City mayoral election in fall 2013.  In effect, the 
mayoral election became a referendum on stop-and-frisk, and mayoral candidate 
William de Blasio was elected in part because of his opposition to the NYPD stop-
and-frisk program.  Upon taking office, Mayor de Blasio replaced NYPD 
Commissioner Raymond Kelly with former Commissioner William Bratton.  
Commissioner Bratton pledged to address NYPD reform through the inclusion of 
“more oversight and training . . . [and] more guidance.”231  In January 2014, the 
Mayor pledged to drop the City’s appeal of the Floyd ruling, though it was not 
officially dropped until October 2014.232  Since then, the City and Commissioner 
Bratton have been working to implement the remedies ordered in Judge 
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Scheindlin’s original ruling, including a joint remedial process that will “develop a 
set of reforms with the direct input of the people most affected by the NYPD’s 
discriminatory stop-and-frisk practices.”233 
 
D. The Current Study  
 
Though federal civil litigation has become one of the primary mechanisms for 
addressing widespread unconstitutional policing, there have been very few 
empirical examinations of the effectiveness of such litigation.  The lack of 
evaluative work on the impact of federal civil litigation has left the mechanism 
vulnerable to criticism,234 and has raised questions about the proper role of the 
federal government in overseeing local law enforcement practices (i.e., 
federalism).235  As a result, we have little understanding of the role that federal 
civil litigation has played in police reform to date, or its potential to effect change 
and reduce unconstitutional policing in the 21st century.  Given the gravity of the 
constitutional violations, as well as the implications and cost for local law 
enforcement agencies, the lack of knowledge regarding the effectiveness of federal 
civil litigation is concerning.  
Dr. Fagan’s analyses in the Floyd case demonstrate that the stipulations of the 
original Daniels settlement had little effect on the manner in which the NYPD 
executed stop-and-frisk activities between 2005 and 2012.  In the wake of the 
Floyd ruling, however, significant events transpired as a result of the litigation and 
the accompanying federal court oversight.  The current study descriptively 
examines the impact of the Floyd case on the nature and prevalence of NYPD 
stops, through a comparison of stop activity and outcomes from 2011 (when the 




A. Data  
 
To determine whether the litigation in Floyd positively influenced stop-and-
frisk activities by the NYPD, the authors compare and contrast official stop-and-
frisk data from 2011 and 2014 as recorded by officers on UF-250 forms.  The data 
are drawn from the NYPD’s Stop, Question, and Frisk Report Database, which is 
                                                                                                                            
 
233 Joint Remedial Process in Floyd v. City of New York: What You Need to Know, CTR. FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (June 23, 2014), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160413131113/https://ccrjustice.org/home/get-involved/tools-
resources/fact-sheets-and-faqs/timeline-floyd-v-city-new-york. 
234 McCoy, supra note 181; Ross & Parke, supra note 197. 
235 Samuel P. Jordan, Federalism, Democracy, and the Challenge of Ferguson, 59 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 1103, 1103 (2015). 
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publicly available online.  The data are available as both a portable file and a 
comma separated values (CSV) file.  For the descriptive analyses presented here, 
the portable files were used in conjunction with SPSS Version 22, whereas the 
CSV files were used to create a map in ArcGIS 10.2.    
Officers are mandated to fill out a UF-250 form if a police officer uses force, 
the person stopped refuses to identify him or herself, or the individual stopped is 
frisked, searched, and/or arrested.236  The following information is found on a UF-
250 form: 
 
x  The suspect’s sex, race, age, height, weight, hair color, eye color, 
and other features such as scars and tattoos.  
x  The location of the stop, including address number, street name, 
intersection, city, state, zip code, police beat, police section, and 
police borough, along with the longitudinal (X) and latitudinal (Y) 
coordinates. 
x  The reason or reasons that led up to the stop, frisk, and/or search. 
x  The reason for police use of force and the type of force employed. 
x  Whether the suspect was frisked, searched, and/or arrested. 
x  Whether contraband or a weapon was found on the suspect.237  
 
B. Analytic Strategy  
 
The authors explore five research questions using NYPD stop-and-frisk data 
from 2011 and 2014: 
 
1.  How has the prevalence of stop-and-frisk changed from 2011 to 
2014? 
2.  Has the geographic concentration of stop-and-frisk changed notably 
from 2011 to 2014? 
3.  Has the nature of what transpires during stops changed notably from 
2011 to 2014 (i.e., frisks, searches, arrests, weapons and contraband 
seized)? 
4.  Have the racial disparities among those subjected to stop-and-frisk 
changed notably from 2011 to 2014? 
5.  Have crime trends in New York City changed in the wake of 
pressure to reform the stop-and-frisk program (post-Floyd ruling)?  
 
                                                                                                                            
 
236 SPITZER, supra note 13, at 63–64. 
237 For a complete list of information listed by police officers on UF-250 forms, see NYPD 
STOP-AND-FRISK DATABASE, supra note 20, Database File Specifications. 




To address these research questions, the authors first examine the prevalence 
of NYPD stops annually from 2003 through 2014.  Second, the authors identify the 
geographic locations of all stops in 2011 and 2014, at the precinct level, and 
examine the percent change in stop locations pre- and post-Floyd ruling.  This 
analysis is of particular interest because the Fagan analyses in the Floyd case 
demonstrated that NYPD stop activity disproportionately targeted neighborhoods 
and precincts where the majority of residents were ethnic minorities.  The analyses 
here will assess whether the racially geographic concentration of stops has 
persisted post-Floyd ruling.  Third, Fagan’s analyses in the Floyd case 
demonstrated that not only were minorities more likely to be stopped, they were 
also disproportionately likely to be subjected to frisk, search, and arrest.  The 
authors descriptively compare stop outcomes both overall, and by citizen 
race/ethnicity, to determine whether the racial disparity finding has persisted in the 
wake of the Floyd ruling.  Fourth, as an indicator of the effectiveness of stops, the 
authors compare the rates at which stops produce guns, other weapons, and 
contraband pre- and post-Floyd ruling.  Finally, the authors explore trends in 
violent and property crime rates, as well as total homicides, through 2014 to 
determine whether reforms in stop-and-frisk (if they occurred) may be associated 
with changes in crime in New York. 
The current study does suffer from several limitations that should be 
acknowledged.  First, the current study presents a descriptive year-to-year 
comparison only, which restricts statements about causality between the federal 
civil litigation and changes in stop-and-frisk practices.  Second, the findings are 
based on NYPD administrative data, and several critics have suggested that the 
UF-250 data may not be complete and accurate.  In fact, there are indications that a 
substantial proportion of stops occur without formal documentation.  Consider that 
Jones-Brown and colleagues reported that although one study estimated that 
approximately 70% of all stops were captured on UF-250 forms, an NYPD 
commander estimated that “only 1 in 10 stops” was documented by officers on the 
UF-250.238  Finally, the earlier discussion demonstrates that a number of events 
after the Floyd ruling may have shaped the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program 
including media attention, a new mayor, and a new police commissioner—though 
many of these events are directly related to the Floyd ruling.  Results should be 





                                                                                                                            
 
238 DELORES JONES-BROWN, BRETT G. STOUDT, BRIAN JOHNSTON & KEVIN MORAN, STOP, 
QUESTION AND FRISK POLICING PRACTICES IN NEW YORK CITY: A PRIMER (REVISED) 3 (July 2013), 
http://www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/app/uploads/2015/09/SQF_Primer_July_2013.pdf; see also 
Weisburd et al., supra note 129, at 148; Rosenfeld & Fornango, supra note 152, at 98.  





A. Stop Counts and Geographic Concentration239   
 
Figure 1 illustrates that the number of stops has dropped precipitously since 
peaking at 685,724 in 2011.  The number declined by 22% in 2012 (to 532,911 
stops), and by another 64% in 2013 (191,851 stops).  In 2014, the NYPD recorded 
just 45,788 stops, a 93% decrease from 2011—the peak of the program just three 
years earlier.  In terms of the Floyd case, the number of stops declined before the 
case went to trial in early 2013.  But the litigation had been pending since 2008, 
and the pressure on the NYPD regarding the stop-and-frisk program was enormous 
in the years leading up to the court case.  It is reasonable to assert an association 
between the Floyd case—as well as the attention it garnered—and the substantial 
decline in stop-and-frisk that began in 2012.  Certainly, the change in mayor and 
police commissioner in early 2014—and their highly publicized decision to drop 
the Floyd appeal and curtail the stop-and-frisk program—explains the continued 
decline in 2014.  
 




                                                                                                                            
 
239 The results reported in this section, including those contained in tables and figures, come 
from our own analyses of the raw data reported in the official NYPD STOP-AND-FRISK DATABASE, 
supra note 20. 




Figure 2 illustrates the degree of change in the concentration of stop-and-frisk 
activity from 2011 to 2014.240   Although every NYPD precinct experienced a 
significant decline in the overall number of stops, some precincts did experience an 
increase in their proportion of the total number of stops, from 2011 to 2014 (darker 
shades, such as the 122nd and 123rd precincts).  Overall, 44 of the 76 precincts 
experienced a decline in their proportion of the total percentage of stops (reflected 
by the lighter shades).  Moreover, that decrease was particularly notable in 
precincts that had previously been disproportionally affected by racially disparate 
stop-and-frisk activities.  
 







                                                                                                                            
 
240 NYPD STOP-AND-FRISK DATABASE, supra note 20.  Note that the 121st precinct was 
excluded from the map because it did not contain stop data in 2011 for a comparison to be made 
against 2014. 
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Table 2 illustrates the finding in a different way.  Prior research indicates that 
ten precincts with large minority populations have experienced a disproportionate 
share of stop-and-frisks.241  Those precincts include: 
 
x  23rd - East Harlem (south) 
x  40th - Mott Haven, Melrose 
x  44th - Concourse, Highbridge 
x  73rd - Ocean Hill, Brownsville 
x  75th - East New York, Starret City 
x  77th - Crown Heights (north), Prospect Heights 
x  79th - Bedford-Stuyvesant (west) 
x  103rd - Jamaica (south), Hollis 
x  115th - Jackson Heights 
x  120th - St. George, West Brighton, Port Richmond 
 
In 2011, these ten precincts were responsible for 27.13% of all stops in New 
York, ranging from 1.66% to 4.53% of the total percentage of stops (77th and 75th 
precincts, respectively).  Table 2 shows that the same ten precincts were 
responsible for just 19.68% of all stops in 2014.  Moreover, seven of the ten 
precincts experienced a decline in the percentage of total stops, with five of the 
precincts experiencing drops of nearly 50% or more.  For example, in the Floyd 
ruling Judge Scheindlin singled out the 75th precinct for its misuse of stop-and-
frisk, and she selected it as the location for the body-worn camera pilot study.  In 
2011, the 75th precinct was responsible for 4.53% of the total stops that year.  By 
2014, the 75th precinct was responsible for just 2.0% of all stops, representing a 
decline of 55.85%.242  In sum, the concentration of stop-and-frisk activity in mostly 
minority precincts has declined considerably following the Floyd ruling. 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
241 JONES-BROWN, STOUDT, JOHNSTON & MORAN, supra note 238, at 41–42. 
242 NYPD STOP-AND-FRISK DATABASE, supra note 20. 














# stops % of        total stops # stops 
% of       
total stops  
23 17,498 2.55 719 1.57 -38.43 
40 17,690 2.58 898 1.96 -24.03 
44 16,903 2.46 1,330 2.9 17.89 
73 25,167 3.67 866 1.89 -48.50 
75 31,100 4.53 917 2.00 -55.85 
77 11,405 1.66 373 0.81 -51.20 
79 14,498 2.11 1,452 3.17 50.24 
103 17,152 2.50 325 0.71 -71.60 
115 18,156 2.65 205 0.45 -83.02 
120 16,490 2.40 1,934 4.22 75.83 
Total 186,059 27.13% 9,019 19.68%  
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B. Stop Outcomes: Frisks, Searches, Arrests, Weapons and Contraband   
 
After a stop occurs, law enforcement officers may take any number of 
subsequent actions—such as frisking a suspect, conducting a full-blown search of 
the suspect, placing the suspect under arrest, and seizing guns, other weapons and 
contraband—depending on the totality of the facts and circumstances they 
encounter.243  Arguably, any increases in the outcomes of post-stop events could 
signal improvements in stop activity, as officers are more accurately assessing 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  Their more accurate assessments of 
reasonable suspicion then lead to more formal outcomes, such as searches, arrests, 
and confiscation of weapons and contraband.   
Figure 3 illustrates that since 2011, frisks, searches, and arrests have all 
occurred with greater frequency.  Frisks increased from approximately 55.7% to 
66.3%, searches increased from 8.5% to 15.9%, and arrests more than doubled, 
from 6.0% in 2011 to 15.1% in 2014.244  One of the most important criticisms of 
the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program was the low rate for recovering weapons and 
contraband, as demonstrated by the 2011 figures in Table 3.  For example, in 2011 
only 0.12% of stops resulted in seizure of a firearm and 1.1% resulted in seizure of 
another type of weapon.  The seizure rates remain low in 2014, but in each case, 
the percent increase from 2011 is notable.  For example, gun seizures increased 
from 0.12% of all stops to 0.44%—an increase of 267%.  Seizures of other 
weapons and contraband increased by 185% and 104%, respectively.  Given the 
more than 90% drop in the total number of stops, these data demonstrate that 
NYPD stop-and-frisk activity improved notably in terms of efficiency and 
















                                                                                                                            
 
243 See generally FERDICO, FRADELLA & TOTTEN, supra note 8, at 307–58. 
244 NYPD STOP-AND-FRISK DATABASE, supra note 20. 


























Knives/other 1.1% 7,444 3.13% 1,431 185% 
Guns 0.12% 819 0.44% 202 267% 
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C. Stop, Frisk, and Racial Disparities 
 
The court ruled in the Floyd case that the NYPD unconstitutionally targeted 
young Black and Latino citizens, in violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.  Table 4 assesses the extent to which racial disparities persisted 
in stop-and-frisk activity after the court ruling, and unlike the findings on 
prevalence, geographic concentration, and outcomes, there appears to be little 
change in the racial make-up of those subjected to stop-and-frisk.245  For example, 
racial/ethnic make-up of citizens stopped in 2011 and 2014 are virtually identical: 
Black (51.1%–53.1%), Black-Hispanic (7.1%–6.1%), White-Hispanic (25.6%–
21.2%), White (9.0%–11.9%), and other (7.2%–7.7%).  The ethnic and racial 
make-up among those frisked changed slightly in 2014, but changes were 5% or 
less (frisks of Black citizens increased by about 3% and frisks of White-Hispanic 
citizens decreased by 5.5%).  Similar stability is seen among those searched and 
arrested.  In sum, the racial disparities among those subjected to stop-and-frisk by 
NYPD officers has changed little since the Floyd ruling.   
 
                                                                                                                            
 
245  NYPD STOP-AND-FRISK DATABASE, supra note 20.  Note that the race/ethnicity categories 
of Asian/Pacific Islander, American Indian/Alaskan Native, and other were all collapsed into a single 
category entitled “other” because of their small sample size. 




Table 4. Racial and Ethnic Composition of Stops, Frisks, Searches & Arrests 
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D. Stop, Frisk, and Crime in New York City 
 
In the weeks following the Floyd ruling, city and police department leaders 
appeared on local and national media, intimating that any changes to the stop-and-
frisk program would produce increases in crime.  Appearing on NBC’s “Meet the 
Press,” for example, former Police Commissioner Kelly said, “No question about 
it, violent crime will go up.”246  Table 5 shows trends in violent and property crime 
rates, as well as overall homicides, in New York City from 2005–2014, and the 
results refute former Commissioner Kelly’s claim.  Violent crime rates continued a 
slow decline from 2005 to 2009 (from 67.3 to 55.2 per 10,000 residents), before 
increasing through 2012 (63.9).  Interestingly, this slight uptick in violent crime 
occurred during the peak years of stop-and-frisk (2010–2011).  Violent crime rates 
then declined slightly in 2013 and 2014 (62.4 and 59.7 per 10,000 residents, 
respectively), as the use of stop-and-frisk dropped off precipitously.  Property 
crime rates followed a nearly identical pattern.  The trends in overall homicide 
directly contradict any claim that reduced use of stop-and-frisk caused an increase 
in violence in New York.  In 2011, there were 515 homicides.  In 2013 and 2014, 
there were 335 and 333, respectively—a 35% decline.247  In short, there is no 
evidence to suggest that reforms to stop-and-frisk compromised the NYPD’s 
ability to effectively fight crime. 
                                                                                                                            
 
246 Amanda Terkel, Ray Kelly on Stop-and-Frisk: ‘No Question’ Violent Crime Will Rise If 
Program Is Stopped, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 18, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/18/ray-kelly-stop-and-frisk_n_3776035.html.   
247 From 2011 to 2014, New York City’s population increased from 8,211,875 to 8,473,938.  
Uniform Crime and Reporting, Offenses Known to Law Enforcement by City: New York (2011-2014), 












Table 5. Crime Trends in New York City, 2005–2014248 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Violent 
Crime 67.3 63.8 61.4 58.0 55.2 58.2 62.4 63.9 62.4 59.7 
Property 
Crime 200.2 187.9 181.9 179.7 169.0 167.5 171.0 172.2 169.1 160.2 
           
Total 
Homicides 539 596 496 523 471 536 515 419 335 333 
 
VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The last 40 years have arguably been the most innovative in the history of 
policing.249  Since the mid-1970s, a host of new strategies have emerged on the law 
enforcement landscape, from problem-oriented policing (POP) and community-
oriented policing (COP), to hot spots policing, focused deterrence/pulling levers 
(e.g., targeted offender strategies), intelligence-led policing, and even predictive 
policing.  The innovation in strategies has been matched by the development of 
new technologies such as geographic information systems (GIS), crime analysis 
and advanced analytics, CompStat, DNA and forensics, license plate readers, less-
lethal alternatives (pepper spray, TASER), body-worn cameras, and gunshot 
                                                                                                                            
 
248  Uniform Crime and Reporting, Offenses Known to Law Enforcement by City: New York 
(2005-2014), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION: 




















249 WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 2, at ch. 6. 
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detection systems.250  During this period of innovation, stop-and-frisk has emerged 
as a preferred tactic for controlling crime and disorder.   
Despite the tremendous innovation in policing, one phenomenon that has 
remained unchanged is the undercurrent of racial injustice.  The misuse and abuse 
of stop-and-frisk appears to be the next iteration of that injustice.  The stories of 
stop-and-frisk in Newark, Philadelphia, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and New York 
illustrate that Williams and Murphy’s “minority view” of policing remains a stark 
reality.  The deaths of Eric Garner, Michael Brown, and Freddie Gray, among 
others, demonstrate the centrality of stop-and-frisk to the persistent racial crisis in 
policing.  These tragic deaths have led to unprecedented attention on racial 
disparities in police actions, best exemplified by the President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing,251 and they have facilitated a national dialogue on the need for 
police accountability and reform.   
As part of this dialogue, federal civil litigation has received considerable 
attention as a potential mechanism for police reform.  Federal civil litigation can be 
employed through a variety of mechanisms, such as individual or class-action § 
1983 lawsuits and U.S. Department of Justice actions via § 14141.  Unfortunately, 
very little research has examined the impact of federal civil litigation on 
unconstitutional police practices, and as a result, there is little understanding of its 
effectiveness (or lack thereof) as an instrument of police reform. 
 
A. Federal Civil Litigation and Police Reform in New York 
 
The current study examines the New York City confluence of racial injustice 
in policing, misuse of stop-and-frisk by officers, and federal civil litigation 
designed to precipitate police reform.  The results provide direct evidence of the 
impact of federal civil litigation on unconstitutional stop-and-frisk practices in 
New York specifically, as well as some more general insights on the potential for 
federal civil litigation to generate police reform. 
The year-to-year comparison of stop-and-frisk in New York highlights a 
number of positive findings, suggesting that the federal civil litigation has begun to 
alter the unconstitutional practices outlined in the Floyd case.  First, the sheer 
number of stops conducted by officers has dropped dramatically, by more than 
90%.  Second, the geographic concentration of stops in mostly minority precincts 
has also declined.  An examination of ten precincts with large minority populations 
showed that the racial/ethnic concentration of stops has dropped by nearly 10% 
overall in those precincts, with some precincts experiencing declines of 50% or 
more.  Third, stops appear to be more efficient and accurate.  The percentage of 
stops resulting in arrest has more than doubled.  The percentage of stops where 
weapons and contraband were seized remain low but those percentages have 
                                                                                                                            
 
250 WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 2, at ch. 6. 
251 PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 19.    




doubled or tripled compared to the 2011 rates.  In short, the NYPD has altered its 
day-to-day practices with regard to stop-and-frisk, to the benefit of thousands of 
New Yorkers.  And importantly, the reforms in the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk 
program coincided with continued declines in crime and violence in New York, 
especially homicides which declined by 35% from 2011 to 2014. 
The one negative finding is the persistence of racial disparities in those 
subjected to stop-and-frisk: minorities remain overrepresented among those 
stopped, frisked, searched, and arrested by the NYPD.  According to the 2010 
Census Bureau, the racial and ethnic composition of New York City is 
approximately 33.3% White, 22.8% Black, 28.6% Hispanic, 12.6% Asian, and 
2.7% “other.” 252   In 2014, the percentage of Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics 
(combining Black-Hispanic with White-Hispanic) stopped was 11.9%, 53.1%, and 
27.3%, respectively.  The authors acknowledge that the racial composition of a 
population is a rough, at best, benchmark for assessing racial disparities.  Other 
benchmarks, such as the racial composition of the arrestee population in New 
York, would suggest much smaller racial disparities.253  Nevertheless, the stability 
in race/ethnicity among those who were stopped in 2011 and in 2014 is troubling, 
given that the federal court determined that the NYPD was engaged in 
unconstitutional stop-and-frisks in 2011.  Notably, the persistence of racial 
disparities in New York is consistent with findings from the few studies that have 
examined the impact of consent decrees on discriminatory police practices in other 
jurisdictions (e.g., New Jersey and Los Angeles).254 
It is clear that more work needs to be done in New York, but this fact should 
not overshadow the considerable progress that the NYPD has made during the last 
few years.  And importantly, the structure for effective police reform in New York 
is in place.  For example, recent changes have been made to training and policy.  
The 2015 student guide for patrol recruits presents officers with a more inclusive 
understanding of diversity issues:  
 
As police officers, you are required to enforce the law impartially 
without regard to actual or perceived race, class, ethnicity, culture, 
religion, age, gender, sexual orientation, disability, immigration or 
housing status.  At the same time, we are members of a larger society in 
which bias and discrimination against certain groups of people are 
matters of historical and statistical fact. . . . As noted in a recent speech 
by Police Commissioner Bratton, American policing has been part of the 
                                                                                                                            
 
252 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF GENERAL HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS: 2010, NEW YORK 
CITY, NEW YORK, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk. 
253 GREG RIDGEWAY, ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE NEW YORK POLICE 
DEPARTMENT’S STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES xii (2007), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2007/RAND_TR534.pdf.  
254 Kupferberg, supra note 200; STONE, FOGLESONG & COLE, supra note 202. 
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best of American history, but unfortunately some of the worst parts as 
well.  Understanding this history and how it has shaped perceptions will 
help you become a better, more effective police officer.255  
 
The NYPD is also in the process of revising the Patrol Guide to provide clearer, 
more accurate guidance on the proper legal standards for stop-and-frisk, including: 
 
(1)  . . . what constitutes a stop, when a stop may be conducted, when a 
frisk may be conducted, and when a search may be conducted; 
(2)  . . . a definition of “reasonable suspicion,” the standard needed for a 
stop based on Terry v. Ohio; 
(3)  . . . that officers must have separate reasonable suspicion that a 
person is armed and dangerous in order to conduct a frisk of that 
person; 
(4)  require[ing] officers to document the stop and reasonable suspicion, 
and, if conducted, the frisk, on both a stop report form (formerly 
called a UF-250) and in their activity logs; 
(5)  require[ing] supervisory review of stops, including review of the 
constitutionality of the stop, not just that a stop report form was 
filled out; and 
(6)  provid[ing] for supervisors to identify officers needing further 
training and/or potential discipline.256 
 
Last, the federal monitor reviews NYPD activities, analyzes data, and issues 
public reports with recommendations for change.  The monitor’s reports can 
document progress, but they can also highlight deficiencies in supervision, policy, 
and training.  The reporting of deficiencies provides a roadmap for continued 
reform, and the public nature of this reporting places tremendous pressure on the 
NYPD to follow that roadmap and address the identified deficiencies.  In sum, the 
findings presented here show that the NYPD has made significant progress since 
2011, and the proper mechanisms are in place to ensure that the department will 





                                                                                                                            
 
255 First Report of the Independent Monitor at 36, Floyd v. City of New York, 08-cv-01034-
AT (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2015), http://nypdmonitor.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/MonitorsFirstReport-AsFiledInFloydDocket.pdf.  
256 Final Recommendations Regarding Patrol Guide 212.11 and Patrol Guide 203.25 at 3, 
Floyd v. City of New York, 08-cv-01034-AT (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2015), http://nypdmonitor.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/Revision-to-Stop-and-Frisk-Preventing-Racial-Profiling-Preventing-Racial-
Profiling-212-211.pdf. 




B. Larger Lessons for Federal Civil Litigation as an Instrument for Police Reform 
 
The federal court litigation in New York was relatively unique.  Since the 
case was filed as a § 1983 class-action lawsuit, plaintiffs first had to satisfy the 
four requirements for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(2), namely numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. 257   Then 
plaintiffs were required to demonstrate Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment liability 
for the certified class as a result of the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program.  Margeson 
highlighted the power of this federal civil litigation approach: 
 
Politics, socio-economic inequality, and the accumulation of precedent 
that has diminished the likelihood of legal redress for Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendment violations have effectively deregulated police 
power to conduct investigative Terry stops.  The Floyd litigation 
demonstrates the immense value of judicial process to advocates of 
social reform, especially where the prospective beneficiaries have been 
underserved by the democratic process.  In Floyd, the democratic and 
judicial processes worked in tandem to effect a policy shift in the 
oversight of police conduct that either branch, acting in isolation, most 
probably would not have achieved.258 
 
Though the Floyd case began as a class-action suit in 2008, the judge’s ruling 
in 2013 mimicked the oversight process outlined in § 14141.  As a result, the 
progress made by the NYPD in the three years since the Floyd ruling speaks 
directly to the potential for § 14141 consent decrees to effect change in police 
departments.  Only a handful of studies have sought to assess the effectiveness of § 
14141 consent decrees on law enforcement agencies engaged in pattern or practice 
unconstitutional policing.  The research is mixed, but there are modestly promising 
findings from that small body of work (e.g., enhanced public satisfaction, 
implementation of new processes and policies, reductions in use of force and 
citizen complaints during the consent decree, and greater transparency via access 
to department data and independent monitor reports). 259   More generally, the 
experiences of agencies under § 14141 consent decrees demonstrate that police 
reform is a complex, multi-year process with a high level of difficulty.  It involves 
organizational change in a profession characterized by resistance to change, and 
the remedies target functions that go to the very core of policing: supervision, 
training, policy, and accountability.  In short, police reform is a marathon, not a 
                                                                                                                            
 
257 See Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (class certification 
opinion); see also Margeson, supra note 174, at 756–64. 
258  Margeson, supra note 174, at 771–72. 
259 See Chanin, supra note 203; Chanin, supra note 204; DAVIS, HENDERSON & ORTIZ, supra 
note 199; Kupferberg, supra note 200; STONE, FOGLESONG & COLE, supra note 202. 
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sprint.  The results from this study demonstrate that important police reforms can 
be achieved early on during the marathon, as a result of federal civil litigation. 
